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Mr. Fordham stands by his legal analysis, and its application to the 
instant dispute, that is set forth in his Opening Brief. He seeks to refrain from 
unnecessarily repeating the arguments, regarding the correctness of which he 
remains confident, that appear in that Brief. 
I. MR. OLDROYD HAS FAILED SATISFACTORILY TO COUNTER 
IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF MR. FORDHAM'S ARGUMENT. 
Mr. Oldroyd has failed satisfactorily to counter important aspects of the 
argument set forth in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief, including the following: the 
proposition that application of the professional rescuer doctrine runs afoul of 
the Utah statutory scheme; the proposition that application of the doctrine runs 
afoul of the fundamental principle of Utah tort law that each person whose 
negligence proximately contributes to an injury should bear his proportionate 
share of fault for his conduct and pay his proportionate share of damages 
caused by his conduct; the proposition that application of the doctrine unfairly 
discriminates against Utah public safety officers; the proposition that the 
original basis of the doctrine is not applicable to the facts of this case; 
(implicitly) by acknowledging (at p. 10 of his Brief) that the doctrine does not 
work to bar Mr. Fordham's claim against the driver whose vehicle struck him,1 
1
 As explained in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief at 20-22, the supposed 
philosophical underpinnings of the professional rescuer doctrine - including 
the notion that public safety officers are paid to encounter risks in the course of 
their employment - should, if consistently applied, prevent public safety 
the proposition that the doctrine is logically and legally inconsistent; and the 
proposition that the Court of Appeals' "duty" and "causation" analyses are 
flawed. 
The Court may fairly infer that Mr. Oldroyd's failure satisfactorily to 
respond to these contentions is not as a result of lack of thoroughness on his 
counsel's part but based on the weakness of the arguments that can be made 
against them. 
II. MR. OLDROYD INCORRECTLY IMPLIES THAT THE 
PROFESSIONAL RESCUER DOCTRINE APPLIES ONLY TO 
CLAIMS OF PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS WHO RESPOND TO 
REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE BY PEOPLE SUCH AS 
MR. OLDROYD. 
Near the end of his Brief, at 11, Mr. Oldroyd contends: 
The [professional rescuer doctrine] recognizes that citizens should be 
free to summon help from professional rescuers without concern that 
they might later be sued by the public safety officer if he or she happens 
to be injured while confronting a hazard in the course and scope of his 
or her employment. To hold otherwise could constitute a [deterrent] to 
citizens summoning help when in need and would essentially create a 
double recovery for public safety officers injured in the course of their 
employment while receiving compensation for doing their jobs.2 
officers from pursuing claims against anyone whose negligence causes them 
to be injured - not only those whose antecedent negligence causes them to 
be at a given scene, but also those whose negligence injures them while they 
are at the scene. 
2
 For reasons explained in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief, at 15, the reference 
to "double recovery" in the final sentence of this excerpt from Mr. Oldroyd's 
Brief should be given no significant consideration. For a basic rule of Utah law 
(see Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-106) is that people injured while doing their jobs 
2 
The fact of the matter is that the doctrine, in its broadest application, 
recognized by the Court of Appeals and urged by Mr. Oldroyd, would work to 
prevent Mr. Fordham from recovering against Mr. Oldroyd regardless of 
whether Mr. Oldroyd himself made a "911" call or otherwise summoned aid. 
According to the Court of Appeals and Mr. Oldroyd's overall position, the 
doctrine would prevent Mr. Fordham from recovering damages from 
Mr. Oldroyd regardless of whether someone else reported Mr. Oldroyd's own 
rollover incident and regardless of whether Mr. Fordham had just happened 
upon the scene.3 
It is also worthy of note that the doctrine would not prohibit claims of, for 
example (this is but one example of the discriminatory nature of the Rule), 
ambulance personnel and paramedics responding to accident scenes caused 
by the negligence of people such as Mr. Oldroyd if such emergency 
responders should happen to be struck by vehicles such as the vehicle driven 
by the person that struck Mr. Fordham. 
have the statutory right, even though they receive workers compensation 
benefits, which do precious little to compensate severely injured people like 
Mr. Fordham, to pursue claims against those whose negligence has caused 
them to sustain damages. 
3
 Indeed, in this case, it was someone else (an occupant of a vehicle that was 
already at the scene), and not Mr. Oldroyd, who made the "911" call. R. 62-
63. 
3 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT BE PERSUADED BY THE FACT 
THAT THE MAJORITY OF JURISDICTIONS THAT HAVE 
CONSIDERED THE ISSUE HEW TO THE PROFESSIONAL 
RESCUER DOCTRINE, GENERALLY OR AS APPLIED TO THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Mr. Oldroyd relies heavily on the proposition that the majority of 
jurisdictions that have considered the issue still cling to the professional 
rescuer doctrine. This Court is, of course, not bound by the case law of other 
jurisdictions. This Court should look at such things as relevant policy 
considerations; the discriminatory nature of the doctrine; its lack of logical 
consistency; the fact that basic principles of established Utah tort common and 
statutory law are not necessarily parts of the law of the states that have 
adopted and still apply the doctrine; and the possibility that the Court may be 
more tuned into basic concepts of fairness than are the courts of some other 
jurisdictions. Applying the doctrine to Mr. Fordham's claim simply on the basis 
of a "head count" of decisions from around the country is not intellectually or 
legally satisfying. 
IV. OTHER JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS IN ADDITION TO 
THOSE CITED AND DISCUSSED IN MR. FORDHAM'S 
OPENING BRIEF, AS WELL AS COGENT ANALYSES BY 
OTHER COMMENTATORS, SUPPORT THE PROPOSITION 
THAT THE PROFESSIONAL RESCUER DOCTRINE, 
GENERALLY OR AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, 
SHOULD NOT WORK TO PREVENT MR. FORDHAM FROM 
PRESENTING HIS CASE AGAINST MR. OLDROYD TO A 
JURY. 
4 
In Wills v. Bath Excavating & Constr. Co., 829 P.2d 405,409 (Colo. App. 
1991), the Colorado Court of Appeals explained: 
We agree with the Banvai [799 P.2d 441 (Colo. App. 1990), a case 
discussed in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief at 18] analysis that, while a 
public safety officer's special skills, training, and experience may be 
considered with reference to any comparative negligence involved, a per 
se grant of immunity to those whose negligence created a dangerous 
situation for the officer is unwarranted. In consequence, we conclude 
that the fireman's rule is no longer the law in Colorado. 
The doctrine of assumption of risk is the law in Colorado and poses a 
question for the trier of fact. And, while not a complete bar to recovery, 
the assumption of risk is to be considered by the trier of fact in 
apportioning negligence. [Citation omitted.] Further because 
assumption of risk is a question for the trier of fact, it may not be 
decided on summary judgment. [Citation omitted.] 
Finally, we are not unmindful of the worthwhile public policy 
considerations which have given rise to the fireman's rule. We are also 
aware of the widespread, albeit often restricted, adoption of the principle 
in other jurisdictions. However we leave to the General Assembly any 
assignment of legal acceptance of the negligence of others to firemen, 
policemen, or any other public safety officers. 
The judgment [in favor of entities similarly situated to Mr. Oldroyd] is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded for trial. 
In Court v. Grzelinski. 379 N.E.2d 281,285 (III. 1978), the Illinois 
Supreme Court held: 
... to the extent a fireman is a person to whom injury from [a] product 
may reasonably be foreseen, he may recover in products liability, even 
though his injury was incurred while fighting a fire in the course of his 
employment. In so holding, we reject the opportunity to extend the 
"fireman's rule" beyond its limited context of landowner/occupier liability. 
5 
Also, in an insightful dissent, in Walters v. Sloan, 571 P.2d 609, 20 
Cal.3d 199, 212-13 (Cal. 1977), Acting Chief Justice Tobriner wrote: 
Proponents of the fireman's rule argue most frequently that it is the 
fireman's job to extinguish fires and the policeman's job to make arrests. 
They conclude that a fireman or policeman can base no tort claim upon 
damage caused by the very risk that he is paid to encounter and with 
which he is trained to cope. The argument, in essence, is that the 
fireman or policeman, in accepting the salary and fringe benefits offered 
for his job, assumes all normal risks inherent in his employment as a 
matter of law, and thus may not recover from one who negligently 
creates such a risk. [Citations omitted.] 
The fallacy in this argument is simply that it proves too much. Under 
this analysis an employee would routinely be barred from bringing a tort 
action whenever an injury he suffers at the hands of a negligent 
tortfeasor could be characterized as a normal inherent risk of his 
employment. Yet, as noted above, past California cases have regularly 
permitted highway workers - whose jobs obviously subject them to the 
"inherent risk" of being injured by a negligent driver - to recover for 
damages inflicted by such third party negligence [citation omitted] and 
have permitted construction workers - whose employment poses 
numerous risks of injury at the hands of another - to recover tort 
damages for work-related injuries so long as the negligent tortfeasor is 
not their employer. [Citation omitted.] 
As these and countless other cases demonstrate, while policemen and 
firemen regularly face substantial hazards in the course of their 
employment and are, theoretically at least, compensated for such risks, 
a host of other employees - highway repairmen, highrise construction 
workers, utility repairmen and the like - frequently encounter 
comparable risks in performing their jobs and, again theoretically, also 
receive compensation for such risks. California decisions have never 
perceived such theoretical compensation as a sufficient basis for barring 
the employee's cause of action against a negligent tortfeasor. 
6 
The author of Case Note. Wauqonei v loutmctn Oil Company -
Arkansas Adopts the Fireman's Rule: Do Volunteer Firefighters Get Burned 
•v ^° 374-75(1997), wrote: 
LJ> denying a public safety officer recovery from a negligent tortfeasor 
the officer is not directed to recover his damages from the general 
public; rather the officer is totally precluded from recovering these 
damages from anyone. Contrast this with other public employees who 
are injured when confronting dangers on their jobs. The latter can 
recover workers' compensation and salary benefits from the public, but 
are also allowed additional tort damages from the third-party tortfeasors. 
Under the "fireman's rule" the injured public safety officer must bear a 
loss which other public employees are not required to bear. 
The author of Note: Egual Protection and the Fireman's Rule in Ohio. 
,23, 144 (1988), wrote: 
The common law governing the suits of firemen and policemen against 
tortfeasors for personal injury damages is in need of a complete 
restructuring. The most traditional fireman's rule bars firemen from 
recovery for injuries directly resulting from a fire and categorize them as 
licensees in their suits against landowners for injury resulting from the 
negligent maintenance of their property. The Ohio courts have not 
modernized, or indeed even altered to any extent, this rule since its 
creation, and the landowner's duty system upon which it is based is 
outdated. 
The determination of whether firemen and policemen can recover for 
their injuries should depend instead, upon the presence of fault, the 
basis of all tort law. In short, the property owner should be liable to the 
[fireman] for his injuries directly resulting from the fire when the 
landowner negligently or intentionally caused the fire. The fireman 
should be owed that same duty of care owed to rescuers and public and 
private employees - a general duty of care owed to all foreseeably 
injured. 
7 
This restructuring would remedy the inequitable treatment suffered by 
firemen and policemen, and at the same time, would further two 
important public policies. Allowing recovery by firemen would serve to 
deter negligence in causing fires and would encourage persons to enter 
this important area of public service which asks man every day to put 
another's safety and welfare before his own. 
See, also. The Missouri "Fireman's Rule": An Unprincipled Rule in Search of a 
Theory. 58 UMKC L. Rev. 329 (1990). 
V. MR. OLDROYD HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY RESPONDED TO 
MR. FORDHAM'S CONTENTION THAT PARTS OF THE 
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION (DEALING WITH DUTY AND 
CAUSATION) NEED TO BE CORRECTED. 
At page 13 of its decision, the Court of Appeals states: 
... we believe that application of the [professional rescuer doctrine] is 
consistent with the existing tort law of this state. 
It is apparently because Mr. Fordham contended, in the Court of 
Appeals proceedings - as he is here contending -- that adoption of the 
professional rescuer doctrine would go against the grain of general principles 
of Utah statutory and common law that the Court of Appeals felt constrained to 
make the quoted observation and then, at paragraphs 21-27, and n. 3, attempt 
to show just how such supposed consistency exists. As Mr. Fordham has, 
however, shown, at pp. 24-26 of his Opening Brief, the Court of Appeals' 
discussion of "The Element of Duty" (paragraphs 21-22) and "The Element of 
Causation" (paragraphs 23-27 and n. 3) is sorely flawed. And Mr. Oldroyd's 
8 
lesponse srf fnrfh nl [>, ' f in il ,ibp J r,\ LI, f urdham's 
argument simply misses the mark. 
. ;.c -..ourt should make it clear that the Court of Appeals' analysis of 
•» i m ' , ii I'.JIH i11 kills lo support adoption of the 
, ; .escuer doctrine in Utah. The Cnuil \ l i i " iH 'MTI I il il . il I n 111 <, llie 
Court of Appeals, make it clear, to the bench and bar, that nothing in the Court 
" ' "'IUHHIS diulysis i I IMIM be viewed lo change general Utah law dealing with 
July oi causation. 
CONTRARY TO MR. OLDROYD'S CONTENTIONS, 
MR. OLDROYD OWED A DUTY OF CARE TO MR. FORDHAM, 
AND THE PROFESSIONAL RESCUER DOCTRINE IS NOT 
BASED ON SOUND PUBLIC POLICY PRINCIPLES. 
In the Conclusion (p. 13^ 
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly determined that the professional 
rescuer doctrine is based upon sound public policy principles. 
Application of the professional rescuer doctrine to the facts of this case 
negate[s] any duty owed by Defendant-Appellant to Plaintiff Appellant 
Fordham.... 
It is fundamental Utah common law that a person who n<"Is finr.liiilinu 
the action erating his motor vehicle in a negligent fashion) owes a duty of 
care to persons iniured m, |iiiiMiiuilf Kfsulls nl I IMI negligence. • 
safety officer such as Mr. Fordham is certainly within the 
a rnattt oi w..,. •* ».v.*t of those foreseeably injured as a result of the 
r> ) 11 iu?rs responding to fires and 
9 
vehicle collision are, indeed, among the most foreseeably injured classes of 
persons who may be injured in response to such incidents. And Mr. Oldroyd 
has in his deposition testimony (see Facts numbered 7-14 set forth at pp. 7-8 
of Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief) acknowledged that proposition to be true in 
the circumstances of this very case. 
It is simply unfair for public safety officers to be singled out for such 
discriminatory treatment. If Mr. Fordham had not been an on-duty public 
safety officer but had been off-duty, or an ambulance worker, or a "Good 
Samaritan" member of the public, the professional rescuer doctrine would not 
prevent him from pursuing a claim against Ms. Oldroyd.. Private sector 
employees and other public employees, such as sanitation department 
workers, water department workers, Department of Transportation 
maintenance crewmembers, and U.S. Postal Service letter carriers, are not 
prohibited by the doctrine from pursuing claims against those whose 
antecedent negligence causes them to be injured while they are responding to 
incidents. Nor are judges or court clerks. But courthouse security officers 
probably are. 
Why, in fairness, should public safety officers (whose job duties do not 
10 
,Acriip .iiurts)4 ho f-eated any differently? What if, for the 
oouvfc ol ais jn empi " w i n agency tu~x had 
' ' "!• workers compensatio.. wwvo.dpo IiDse? 
vehicle struck Mr. Fordham had no liability coverage, instead of the low 
• " ' ^ l ' 1 .• •', nuu, and was impecunious? What if, in the 
iin it t-i.s tit responding to Mr. Oldrovd'Q .-.. : ^ver, 
Mi l urdham had been directly injured not by a car driven by another motorist 
<ploding vehicle, with the explosion having been caused 
_y .legligent maintenance by Mr. »« a 
manufacturing defect in the vehicle itself? Should Mi ' 
• -•. -. -ii similarly situated, be left with no remedy whatsoever? 
• ••«.. does n ' ILI I i! Hi', mil n , l llu,' Lourt of Appeals 
decision. 
. , ort law system is fully equipped fairly and justly, based on 
establishf in Hi UMIUJ pi,;<imale causation, and proportionate 
shares ntta«. deal with Mr. Fordham's drum i'|ni'»t" MI • 'I'li'iyu ,«ii>i 
(..Itiiiii:.- ul ullioi victims of antecedent negligence without application of the 
(unipssionnl IHM in I itm ini, Ai id there is, contrary to the Court of Appeals 
4
 It should be kept in mind that Mr. Fordham himself was not, strictly speaking, 
involved in any "rescue" efforts at the time he was injured. 
11 
decision and Mr. Oldroyd's contentions, no truly good reason - especially in 
the face of all the contrary considerations suggested hereinabove and in 
Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief - for this Court to adopt the doctrine as part of 
the common law of Utah. 
Nearly all of the cases discussed by Mr. Oldroyd deal, in one form or 
another, with the concept of assumption of risk. The Court of Appeals 
recognized, at fl 16 of its decision, that"... adoption of the professional-rescuer 
doctrine in Utah cannot be supported by a rationale based upon a theory of 
assumption of risk." The Court of Appeals then appears to have founded its 
decision substantially on the public policy principle announced in Berko v. 
Freda, 459 A.2d 663, 666 (N.J. 1983): 
Governmental entities maintain police and fire departments in 
anticipation of those inevitable physical perils that burden the human 
condition, whereas most public employment posts are created not to 
confront dangers that will arise but to perform some other public function 
that may incidentally involve risk.... 
This fundamental concept rests on the assumption that 
governmental entities employ firefighters and police officers, at least in 
part, to deal with the hazards that may result from their taxpayers' own 
future acts of negligence.... Exposing the negligent taxpayer to liability 
for having summoned the police would impose upon him multiple 
burdens for that protection. 
The crux of this view is that, because public safety officers are hired to 
confront dangers, whereas other classes of public employees perform 
12 
*• actions that ( ' "incidentally involve risk," and regardless of th< • 
;.i ;. ameers w^ • office or other jobs that seldom cause !:._..
 t 
tu confront r exampl° nrt-"' u~ 
injured while performing "rescuer" tasks, public safety officer in 
claims against antecedent tortfeasors whose conduct causes hem to respond 
I,, ...M'lh-, imi MIIMM NMU Him „ ordham understands the 
analysis but suggests that it appears 
rationale. The distinction, which closes the courthouse dooi io an entire d 
Idigc finrl 'Vit l i Li , I Ulahns, appears to be at least somewhat arbitrarily 
u i CJVVI i. 
Mr Fordham commends to the Court's attention Justice Handh 
dibse "-"KO, 4 by t\.Ad at 668-74 Particularly cogent excerpts tr . ; . 
dissent include fhp following: 
The majority attempts to distinguish police officers and fire fighters 
who are paid to "confront danger" from other kinds of public employees 
on the ground that the latter are merely paid "to perform some other 
public function[s] that may incidentally involve risk."... This asserted 
distinction merely disguises the fact there are more similarities than 
differences between police officers and fire fighters and a host of other 
public employees. Police officers on traffic patrol may be exposed to 
risks entirely comparable to highway workers doing road work. Many 
5
 Another troubling aspect of the doctrine is that it appears to bar claims of on-
duty public safety officers who go "beyond the call of duty" - whatever that 
means ~ and perform truly heroic acts that might arguably be considered to be 
"voluntary" in nature, i.e., beyond what the duties for which they are paid fairly 
require. 
13 
public employees - police officer and sanitation worker alike - confront 
dangers on the job. Conversely, both classes of employees also 
confront "ordinary" risks not involving usual danger. Because law 
enforcement in some instances entails greater risks, police officers 
should not be deemed to have forsaken the right to seek compensation 
for injury resulting from such risks - unless, as the majority seems to 
believe, the monetary compensation that police officers receive is 
commensurate with the extraordinary risks of their jobs. ... But, no 
empirical or rhetorical support is marshaled to bolster this assumption. 
And even if police officers and fire fighters are presumed to be 
adequately compensated for the risks of their work, the majority does 
not explain why other governmental employees, who must also be 
presumed to receive adequate compensation for their work, should not 
therefore be prohibited, as are police officers and fire fighters, from 
recovering from negligent third parties for injuries attributable to the risks 
normally inherent in their employment. 
The majority also claims that its holding is in accord with 
"fundamental concepts of justice" that call for the "prohibit[ion of] a 
police officer from complaining of negligence in the creation of the very 
occasion for his engagement."... It explains "that governmental entities 
employ firefighters and police officers, at least in part, to deal with the 
hazards that may result from their taxpayers' own future acts of 
negligence," and further, that "[ejxposing the negligent taxpayer to 
liability for having summoned the police would impose upon him multiple 
burdens for that protection." ... 
This is, in my consideration, a weak frame upon which to drape 
the heavy weight of a public policy argument. The contention that 
taxpayers will be forced to bear multiple burdens for police and fire 
protection incorrectly assumes that the police officer or fire fighter has 
already been compensated adequately for the injury received in the line 
of duty. Additionally, the argument inaccurately characterizes the 
particular tortfeasor as a "taxpayer" of the municipality or governmental 
entity that employs the police officer or fire fighter. Any citizen, any 
member of the public, regardless of whether he or she pays taxes to the 
municipality, is entitled to the police and fire protection offered by 
government; that entitlement does not rest upon the payment of taxes in 
14 
support of government. Further, the "notion" that a taxpayer is the 
employer of the police officer or fire fighter is ill-conceived. ... If this 
characterization were sound, the defense of workers' compensation 
would presumably bar any public employee's right to recover from a 
negligent taxpayer whose tortious conduct caused injuries received by 
the public employee arising out of his or her employment. And, on this 
premise, this bar would apply to all injuries received directly in ll n I if 
duty including those attributable to so-called "independent cau; i in 
short, there would be no need for a "fireman's rule." 
. once officers and fire fighters should not be placed beyond the 
< ° iiHicial philosophy that searches for just and fair results. 
note that Justice Handler r • • • 
another vigorous dissent, in Rosa v. Dunkin' Donuts. 583 A.2c . ._~, 
1i i ' :Mii i I I I I I 111 mi course nl vvhiili he WMJIC, al 1 HO: 
I strongly believe we should abrogate the fireman's rule. The rule, as 
currently formulated, is obtuse and abstruse. It needlessly extends an 
immunity that has a dubious value. We have, except in the face of the 
most compelling countervailing reasons, eliminated and restricted 
common-law immunities. ... I do not see how the beneficent purposes 
of the law would be undermined if claims based on such ordinary work-
related negligence were to be addressed and resolved by the 
application of generally-understood and accepted tort principles. 
v., •/,-• , -. Wei Ihe New •• * .egislature, perhaps persuaded by the 
i oras, statutorily abrogated the professional 
rescuer doctrine See, N -.uu. * ^ ^ JUh'A-'il lid' 
(N.J. Super. 2006). This does not, _: ^.ju.se, meat........ uJui Court should 
delei lo the Ul.ili Legislature with respect to the adoption of a rule of law -
15 
rejection of the professional rescuer doctrine ~ that is sound and good. That 
would not help Mr. Fordham, a decent and honorable man who was severely 
injured while trying to protect people from harm. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As has been articulated in Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief and in the 
foregoing analysis and examples of case law and commentary treatment of the 
issue, this Court should rule that no part of the professional rescuer doctrine is 
or should be part of the common law of the State of Utah. There are 
compelling reasons to so rule and no truly satisfactory reason to rule 
otherwise. 
This Court has historically vigilantly protected the rights of classes of 
Utahns to be treated fairly and nondiscriminatorily. It has many times been 
called upon to scrutinize legislative enactments to see whether they pass Utah 
and federal constitutional muster. This Court is also sometimes faced with its 
own common law precedents' standing in the way of fair, modern, and 
nondiscriminatory rules of law. There is here no such statute to consider, and 
there is here no troubling precedent to consider overturning. This Court is free 
to announce, and should announce, a rule of law that is based on fairness and 
is consistent with general Utah statutory and common law and that 
categorically rejects the professional rescuer doctrine. 
16 
Alli'iiuliwHy, <inil il Mil1. ( mill r. MIIIICIIHW |it.;isu.ided UIHI Hit1 iiiujiiiiil 
puipose of the doctrine - to insulate from liability landowner " V ^ 
negligence causes firefighters to an iv ' scenes of fires '• vhatever 
H:S.)S<»ll 111, lkt^> S e l ' S i . ' , 11(1' < m i l l . 0 0 « t •> 
Mr. Fordham's Opening Brief and in this > imit anr > i 
doctrine to such circumstances only (circumstances that are not p « 
case). 
This Cnurl shouU, in .iny ' ' v^ i l , ml< Hull IL |iihlrvii«tii,il iesi.:iw-?i 
doctrine does not preclude Mr. Fordham from pursuing his claims against 
Mr. Oldroyd and should, accordingly, reverse the Court of Appeals' affirmance 
*. 
I he Cu- i : of Appeals did not correctly adopt the professii >nnl rest i n 'i 
doctrine, and it did not correctly delineate the rationales supporting it and its 
Respectfully submitted this _ / 5 dnv nl Auniisl ,'l)llii 
~ - ^ 
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